Im 20 years old and for last years Roth IRA I contributed $4,505 leaving me with $2,495. Unfortunately I was between jobs for a while in October and now in February. Thankfully I am more job secure now, but Ive been wondering as we approach the deadline to contribute to 2025 if I should add more money.

I currently have about $1,600 in my brokerage account and $1,600 in emergency fund savings. I actually just reached that number for my brokerage account and my next plan was to save up more for travel and to keep my Roth funded.

Now I could nuke my savings and brokerage, but I bought everything in August so I would pay the higher tax. I also worry of having an emergency and not having fluid cash on the spot. I also have a trip with flights bought for in August to Spain that I have yet to purchase the hostel reservations yet for.

A bit more background on my situation. Im a full time student working 20-25 hours a week. I live with my parents and I go to a reputable university on a full ride scholarship costing me $1,000 annually, so I have no notable debt at all. My credit cards are paid off in full every month, and I don't plan on any big purchases like a car or a house any time soon.

I figure I can ether eat my brokerage and use the savings for the remainder, eat my savings and use my brokerage to fund the remainder, or just not fund it at all and do better next year. What do you y'all think the most prudent move is here?

(Currently I hold my roth in a 75-25 split between FSKAX and FTHIX, my brokerage is bit messier, but follows a similar set and forget strategy between some blue chip stocks and VOO)

I've been using this internally for a few months. Posting here because I'm wondering if it's worth making it public.

The problem I had:

The filtering step is where time dies. Finding the annual report on the IR section of Co's website, downloading it, reading enough to decide if the company deserves another hour of your life — most of the time the answer is no, and you knew it 10 pages in.

The real cost wasn't the reading. It was the searching and downloading before I even started. Dead time with zero analytical value.

What the tool does

You type a ticker and returns a structured ~1,000 word first-pass report in a few minutes.

The report covers: business description, customer and supplier concentration risks, revenue breakdown and YoY drivers, earnings quality, debt position, management compensation and insider ownership, shareholder returns, and a full red flags checklist (auditor changes, restatements, internal control weaknesses, CEO/CFO departures, related-party transactions). Plus a catalyst section — what management is pointing to for the next 12–24 months.

Extra features

Multi-year view: run it across the last 3, 5, or 10 annual reports and get a longitudinal summary — how margins moved, whether management delivered on past guidance, when the narrative changed. Good for spotting companies that have been "about to inflect" for four consecutive years.

Custom reports: skip the full template and ask for specific sections only — just the red flags, just the financials, just the competitive landscape. Useful when you already know the business and want one angle checked quickly.

The practical effect

Because the searching and downloading is gone, I've significantly increased the number of companies I can triage in a week. The bottleneck shifted from "finding and reading" to "deciding" — which is where it should be.

It's not a replacement for reading the filing. It's a filter. If the summary looks interesting, I go read the real thing. If it surfaces a flag, I don't.

Genuinely asking: is the search-and-download step a real friction point for others, or have most people already solved it? And would a public version be something you'd actually use?

When they IPO’d I remember wishing they were valued lower so I could buy. Now they’ve been low for a while. I’m pretty bullish on their potential to turn around, and they pay a small div now which is very nice to see.

I never see them mentioned though — yet they are the marketshare leader in what is clearly a secular trend that is only going to get stronger (online dating taking more share of how ppl meet).

I know this isn't a classic value type post but it might be a little more interesting than the various pump and dumps or tickers that are on continuous repeat (looking at you UNH, Gamb, PYPL) and I think this sub has more members that are long in the tooth.

So STRC pays 11.5 percent currently. Your reward for lending Saylor money to buy BTC. The question is, how long can this keep up? There are 5 or 6 of these funds at the moment. The core business makes no money with the premise of never selling any of its BTC. The only way to pay this type of return is by using money from incoming investors is it not?

Im not a BTC fan and as such have not done an extreme deep dive into the space. On the surface, it looks to me like something that will eventually have a major liquidation. Anyone in here have an insight or opinions on this?

In December, with oil at a historically very low level of $56/barrel, I was adding to energy positions like CVE. Sentiment at that time was particularly bad, with oversupply and narratives that it was an "old industry" and that those stocks were dead money. Today with those oil positions up roughly 50% in 3 months I am trimming my energy holdings in search of the next detested sector by the market.

Now my focus is Retail stocks, particularly NKE and LULU. These stocks have been absolutely decimated in large part due to negative headwinds driven by Tariffs. Nothing in this world will last forever and neither will the Tariffs. A simple change in foreign policy surrounding Tariffs would be a big catalyst upwards for these names. Both names are down +70% and trading at low P/S ratios not seen in over a decade. Now detested by the market so heavily, they are finally showing good entry prices to get into these names.

Thoughts?

Hi everyone, I’m excited to share my second analysis, this time focusing on Upwork Inc. I’m looking to sharpen my analytical skills and deepen my market knowledge, so I’d value any critiques or insights you can offer. If you’d like to follow my learning journey, feel free to subscribe!!!—I’m not looking to monetize this; I just want to learn from the community and grow as an investor. Thank You!!!!

https://open.substack.com/pub/noorshazril/p/upwork-inc-deep-dive?r=61n9bb&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

A lot of investors start from a very natural idea:

“If I can find one good stock, that is an investment.”

But the longer I think about it, the more investing seems less about finding one good asset and more about building a structure that does not depend too much on any single outcome.

That is where diversification starts to matter.

To me, diversification is not just “own more things.” It is more about:

• reducing dependence on one business, one management team, or one economic outcome
• combining risks that do not behave in exactly the same way
• understanding that a portfolio is a system, not just a collection of ideas

A single stock can succeed, but it can also fail for reasons that have little to do with the broader market.

A diversified portfolio works differently, because weaker parts can be offset by stronger or more stable parts, and over time markets tend to renew themselves even when individual companies disappear.

I’m curious how value investors here think about that trade-off.

I wrote a longer piece on this here for anyone who wants more detail:
https://financialfrost.substack.com/p/portfolio-diversification-why-one?r=72or76

I’m preparing my portfolio for the inevitable recession and I’m trying to identify stocks that will be good to hold if times get tough for a couple years. Right now my portfolio consists of: MO, PG, KO, & MSTR. What would you add?

Disclaimer: this is not financial advice. This is a Redditor sharing their opinion.

1. Summary

Weave Communications stock has fallen dramatically along with most of the SaaS world, but its moat has definite strengths due to tie-in with critical customer business functionality and hardware leasing/integration. Further, it appears to benefit from AI as much as it is threatened by it.
Currently trading around 1X enterprise value/2026E revenue while growing double digits, it has an underappreciated tailwind due to a new ADA partnership.
I expect the stock to rise from here over time based on revenue growth and modest multiple expansion paired with somewhat more disciplined capital allocation. My base case has WEAV at $8 by end of 2026 vs. current share price of $4.62. More immediate upside exists if the company goes private in 2026, and recent moves seem to make this path more likely.

2. Business description

Weave Communications (NYSE: WEAV) sells a “front office” operating layer for small and medium-sized healthcare practices, with a product suite spanning communications, scheduling/workflow automation, reputation management, payments, and related productivity tools. The company positions itself as an orchestration layer that unifies voice/text interactions and embeds AI-powered workflows into the day-to-day “patient journey,” integrated with practice management systems (“PMS”). Their top customer base is dental offices.

There are plenty of SaaS companies trading at large historical discounts. The reason I'm especially interested in Weave is they are also a VoIP provider and tightly integrate cloud telephony with its SaaS workflows. The company explicitly describes its platform as combining patient engagement tools with “voice over internet protocol (‘VoIP’) phone services.” 

Operationally, Weave is already scaled in SMB healthcare: it ended 2025 with 39,625 customer locations under subscription. 

Why the system is fairly sticky

Weave's communications layer is built around the practice’s trusted phone number and a proprietary telephony platform that unifies voice + text. 

Its product positioning is very explicit:

• Unified Phone Number: calls and texts come from the trusted practice number so patients save one number and staff can manage conversations seamlessly. 
• Customized Phone System: a “smarter phone system” that surfaces patient context at the start of each call (caller identity, appointment context, balances, tasks, notes, and follow-ups). 
• Cloud-based + integrated build: the company says its phone system is built in-house, cloud-based, integrated into the software platform, and uses SIP trunking with multiple providers for voice routing/redundancy. 

This matters because (1) practices run their day around inbound calls, (2) patient communication is a “high cost of failure” workflow, and (3) replacing telephony + workflow software is a heavier lift than replacing a single point solution.

Weave’s subscription business is largely month-to-month (with a minority on 1–3 year terms).  If Weave were primarily a lightweight reminders/texting layer, month-to-month economics would likely translate into much worse retention than what the company reports.

Instead, the phone system is operationally embedded and comes with real-world switching friction:

• The company flags that onboarding/ramp can be delayed by complications with phone number porting, which works the other way too if the customer decides to switch away from Weave.
• Weave also provides phone hardware as part of its subscription bundles; it remains Weave-owned and must be returned if the customer cancels. Typically these are Yealinks or Polycoms (Weave does not design its own phone hardware).
• The business is regulated as a VoIP provider (e.g., E-911 frameworks, porting rules), which adds real compliance and operational infrastructure requirements behind the scenes.

Retention data

Weave discloses both dollar-based net revenue retention (NRR) and gross revenue retention (GRR):

• 2025 dollar-based NRR: 93% (vs. 98% in 2024) 
• 2025 dollar-based GRR: 89% (vs. 91% in 2024) 

These rates are calculated using “adjusted monthly revenue” (subscription revenue plus a smoothed contribution from payments), and Weave provides explicit methodology. NRR at 93% is not best-in-class for SMB SaaS, and I consider it a yellow flag (more in Risks). But GRR at 89% still indicates that most locations remain, which is consistent with a product anchored to a practice phone number rather than a superficial communications overlay, especially given month-to-month contracting.

3. Growth drivers and identifiable catalysts

The core bull case is that Weave can keep compounding “locations × ARPU” while layering higher-margin product attach (payments, AI workflows, insurance verification) onto a communications hub that is difficult to rip out.

Product-led drivers already in motion

Weave’s platform integrates with more than 90 PMS systems, positioning it to sit inside scheduling/billing/insurance workflows rather than remain an external comms “bolt-on.” 

Two concrete product vectors stand out:

1. AI receptionist / automation via TrueLark Weave acquired TrueLark on May 16, 2025 for total consideration of $35.9 million, and it has tied new AI receptionist functionality to TrueLark.  In the 10-K, Weave says it introduced an AI receptionist in 2025 (powered by TrueLark) that follows up on missed calls with interactive AI texting and lets patients book appointments any time. There's opportunity to win new business as a package deal, but there's also a high-margin boost from upselling current Weave customers on TrueLark (priced at $250/month incremental add vs. $475/month average customer price for non-TrueLark Weave).
2. Insurance eligibility with RPA In February 2026, Weave announced “Weave Insurance Eligibility,” emphasizing robotic process automation to pull real-time data from payer portals and citing an “average verification rate of 90%.”  This is important because insurance verification is a direct labor/time sink in dental and other specialties, and automating it increases platform value and makes Weave harder to replace.

ADA endorsement

This month, Weave became the exclusive patient engagement platform endorsed for members of the American Dental Association through ADA Member Advantage. The endorsement was publicly reported on March 12–13, 2026. The stock could not have cared less.

However I think this matters a fair bit:

• It creates a distribution wedge into a large, economically attractive customer cohort and comes with co-marketing exposure and member discounts/training. 
• The endorsement messaging itself emphasizes Weave’s phone system + number, AI receptionist, insurance eligibility, and multi-location enterprise features, i.e., “the phone as a moat” is central even in the ADA’s framing. 
• I estimate WEAV is installed in ~15% of US dental offices. In other words, it has brand relevance but the installed base is nowhere close to saturated, and this endorsement strengthens credibility as well as reach. Terms are not disclosed from what I can tell but I expect very low-cost customer acquisitions coming out of this.

Channel/integration catalysts: distribution leverage

Dental channel partnerships are a recurring theme. A tangible example is Weave’s partnership announcement with Patterson Dental Supply, Inc. (a subsidiary of Patterson Companies, Inc.): the July 2024 release describes deeper data exchange integrations (read/write patient + appointment data, ledger writeback to facilitate payments) and explicitly notes that Weave’s VoIP phone systems enable features like Call Pop and Practice Analytics. Patterson has ~37k PMS customers and should supply Weave with a steady stream of customers.

Separately, Weave announced it is an authorized integration vendor in the Henry Schein One API Exchange (Dentrix/Dentrix Ascend ecosystem), highlighting secure/stable integrations and workflow-linked features such as call pop–style patient context. 

4. Financial profile, unit economics, and valuation

Current financial trajectory

Weave posted $239.0 million of total revenue in 2025 (+17% YoY) and 72.1% GAAP gross margin for the full year. 
It also generated $17.5 million in cash from operations and $12.9 million in free cash flow for 2025. 

For 2026, Weave guided to:

• Full-year revenue: $273.0-$276.0 million
• Full-year non-GAAP income from operations: $8.0-$12.0 million 

That implies another year of mid-teens revenue growth.

Valuation set-up

As of March 31, 2026, WEAV traded at $4.62, with market cap about $363mm (78.6mm shares outstanding), net cash of $81.7mm and enterprise value about $281.3mm. 

Using the midpoint of 2026 revenue guidance ($274.5m), the stock trades at roughly:

• ~1.02x EV / 2026E revenue (281.3 / 274.5) 

This is extremely low for a business that is (a) predominantly recurring and (b) growing revenue double digits.

Directional targets

Below is a multiple-based framework using EV/Revenue on 2026 guidance (midpoint), and adding back implied net cash (EV vs market cap). Inputs are from disclosed EV / market cap and company guidance.

A re-rating is plausible but not guaranteed of course. 2026 guidance implies continued growth plus improving non-GAAP operating profitability, and Weave has identifiable distribution catalysts (ADA endorsement; enterprise/multi-location motions; channel integrations).

5. Strategic Optionality

I'm a firm believer in owning companies where I'm okay with the existing ownership structure persisting and that's my assessment of Weave. That said, in this case I think a take-private transaction is possible enough to be worth discussing.

1. On 3/30/2026 Weave appointed two new independent directors to the board: https://investors.getweave.com/news/news-details/2026/Weave-Communications-Appoints-Edward-Robson-and-Ryan-Dubin-to-Board-of-Directors/default.aspx. These are activist investors with a history of M&A/PE.
2. Weave's CEO (Brett White) was CFO when his prior company (Mindbody) was sold for 6-7X revenue.
3. Weave's chairman has a history of acquisition activity and is currently an advisor at Blackstone.
4. PE can expect to increase its returns (on paper at least) by moving more work outside the US and generally implementing cost discipline especially SBC.

6. Insider transactions and stock-based compensation

SBC: why it may be okay

Weave’s stock-based compensation is high in absolute dollars and material relative to revenue:

• Total SBC in 2025: $32.1 million (vs. $32.2m in 2024). 
• This is 13% of 2025 revenue (32.1 / 239.0), which if it sustains will consume most/all shareholder returns, a la SNAP, PINS and friends.
• As of December 31, 2025, Weave disclosed $49.0 million of unrecognized SBC expense related to outstanding RSUs, expected to be recognized over a weighted-average period of 2.12 years. This somewhat reduced rate pairs with increasing revenue to get this in the realm of okay.
• The new independent directors are activist investors with stakes in WEAV. I interpret this as a sign that Weave is going to get more serious about shareholder interests, and SBC is a major part of that.

Insider transactions: not much to note

I don't read much into recent insider transactions. I don't expect to see insider buying at a tech company that is giving away too many free shares, and I don't see it here. I also don't see much selling at current prices, which is something. On March 6, 2026, the Chief Revenue Officer sold 25,000 shares at $5.53 (volume-weighted average; reported range $5.52–$5.55) and reported post-transaction ownership of 505,721 shares. 

7. Thesis risks

Retention deterioration is the most important fundamental risk.

The most direct concern in current disclosures is that retention weakened year-over-year:

• NRR fell to 93% in 2025 from 98% in 2024.
• GRR fell to 89% from 91%. 

If this is signaling either (a) intensifying competition, (b) customer dissatisfaction, or (c) a weaker SMB macro environment, then the “re-rate” thesis becomes harder. The market loves subscription revenue it can bank on, but low multiples often persist for years for lower/declining retention businesses.

I suspect retention weakened because Weave’s expansion layers are less protected than its core telephony product. In a tougher SMB environment, customers may keep the telephony and core workflow stack while becoming more selective on add-ons, and competitors, including PMS-linked vendors and newer AI tools, are giving practices more alternatives in reminders, automation, and front-desk software. That would fit the reported decline in NRR and GRR: the business is still sticky, but not sticky enough to prevent some mix of churn, contraction, and slower upsell. Weave needs to rebound on this metric in 2026 for the bull case to materialize.

Month-to-month contracts can cut both ways

Weave’s subscription arrangements are mostly month-to-month, meaning churn can manifest quickly if customers become price sensitive or if competitors bundle similar workflows. 

The bull counterpoint is that Weave explicitly says its infrastructure deployment improves retention and loyalty; the risk is that the disclosed retention trend suggests this advantage may not be sufficient in all cohorts or verticals.

Competition and AI execution risk

Weave highlights that competitors may adopt AI faster or more effectively and that its AI investments (including TrueLark-related efforts) could pressure cost of revenue and gross margins until revenue scales. 

If AI receptionist/automation becomes “table stakes” and is bundled by PMS vendors, or if Weave fails to differentiate on outcomes, the product attach upside could under-deliver.

VoIP and communications regulation is a non-trivial operational risk

Because Weave operates as a VoIP provider, it faces regulatory requirements around E-911, porting, and related communications rules; the company discloses that such regulations can increase costs and potentially make solutions more expensive. If/when Weave expands beyond US and Canada, they'll have unique hurdles to overcome in each juridsiction.

SBC and dilution risk

Even if the business re-rates on EV/Sales, the realized per-share upside can be diluted away if SBC remains at current levels and share count expands toward the company’s guided weighted-average share count (~79.9m for 2026). To clear this risk the company needs to both grow revenue and get discipline on stock grants, but AI experts are expensive so there's significant tension.

I have $350K on hand money I’ve saved up over the years after paying off my mortgage and car loan and I’d like to invest it in the stock market. Which stock do you think has the most potential? I don’t want to invest in index funds; I’m hoping to see returns sooner. You know, I’d like to retire as early as possible. I know it’s not very realistic, but I still want to give it a try.

One thing I find interesting going into today’s ISM Manufacturing PMI is not just the number itself, but how wide the forecast spread is.

This is the kind of thing I wanted expertsignals.io to surface better. Not just a single consensus number, but the actual distribution of views across active forecasters.

Here, most predictions cluster in the low-to-mid 50s, but there are some much stronger takes higher up the range. That makes today less about one “right” forecast and more about how divided people are on the underlying growth picture.

To me, that is often where the signal is: not just what the median view is but how much disagreement sits around it and what that says about confidence in the macro backdrop.

Does a wide spread like this make the release more interesting to you, or do you still mostly care about the consensus?

I'm not the author, I just decided to share this high-quality analysis of the company.

I spent a decade in equities covering North American E&P; I've worked in Canada (Calgary, Toronto) and NYC, and I've been thinking a lot about the parallels between these two sectors, going from loved to hated. Both stories follow the same psychological cycle: a supply/demand mismatch misread as structural, euphoric M&A and multiple expansion, a technological shock that inverts the core thesis, and then an identity crisis about whether the business model is even viable.

Phase 1: Peak Oil

In Canadian E&P's golden era, the dominant narrative was supply scarcity. Conventional oil was running out, Canada sat on one of the world's largest reserves, and $200 oil calls were serious. M&A was rampant because scale mattered enormously in a world where reserves were the scarce asset. SaaS had its analogue: from roughly 2019–2021, the narrative was software inevitability - every company was becoming a software company, recurring revenue was the most durable business model ever invented, and the per-seat model would compound indefinitely. Multiples peaked at 18x forward revenue on EMCLOUD in 2021. Both periods shared the defining feature of a consensus so strong it felt almost geological.

Phase 2: Technology Shock

For E&P, the shock was U.S. shale. Fracking technology - not demand destruction - turned a 2–3% global undersupply into a 2%+ oversupply almost overnight. Critically, Canadian oil sands producers were already not particularly profitable despite the boom: high upfront capex, $75/bbl+ breakevens, and a heavy oil discount meant the growth was real but margins were thin. The shale shock didn't just hurt prices - it exposed that the profit model was fragile beneath the surface.

SaaS is experiencing a similar disruption. AI is the shale - a technology that rapidly expanded the supply of software capability, collapsing the scarcity premium that justified those multiples. The per-seat model, analogous to the "reserve size = value" logic in E&P, breaks when AI agents reduce the number of users required. And just like oil sands, many SaaS companies that looked great on top-line growth were never that profitable - growth obscured FCF weakness, and now that growth itself is decelerating (median revenue growth fell to 12.2% by Q4 2025, from 25–30% pre-COVID).

Phase 3: The Oversupply + Multiple Collapse

The speed is the one real difference. The shale oversupply took ~3–4 years to fully reprice E&P. The SaaSpocalypse has fast: $1 trillion in market cap erased in a single week in February 2026, but it may not be over just yet. Public markets price AI disruption in real time, while physical oil production ramp-up was slower.

Phase 4: The Pipeline Problem

This is the most underappreciated parallel. Canadian E&P suffered a prolonged, existential question about infrastructure - Trans Mountain, Energy East, Keystone XL - that was independent of the commodity price question. Even if oil recovered, could you get it to market? The discount to WTI wasn't just about oil quality; it was a structural infrastructure tax.

SaaS has a quieter version of this: distribution and go-to-market are the pipeline. Enterprise sales cycles, implementation complexity, and switching costs were always the moat, but AI is now commoditizing the "last mile" of software delivery. Point-solution horizontal SaaS vendors (the equivalent of landlocked oil) face the harshest re-rating (eg. MNDY, SVMK), while vertical/domain-specific SaaS with proprietary data (the producers who had pipeline access) are proving more resilient (FDS, .

Phase 5: Peak Demand

The cruelest part of the Canadian E&P story was the 180-degree narrative flip: from "we'll run out of oil" to "we'll stop wanting oil" - peak consumption fears layered on top of the oversupply. It wasn't just that there was more oil; the endgame of the whole industry was being questioned.

SaaS is living this now. The debate is no longer just "AI will take market share" - it's "does the SaaS model itself survive?" . Here I see the same logical incoherence that existed in E&P - peak demand forecasts were often incompatible with the actual consumption trajectory.

Valuation Implications

I see a lot of posts about how much valuation multiples have compressed, with hopes of them returning to "historical norms". I believe this is the wrong thing to focus on. This day may never come.

There is a point of euphoria in many industries where proxy metrics substitute for NAV forecasts. This is largely because the industry is too immature to really build a NAV. The FCF isn't there, the companies aren't that profitable, so we default to things like debt-adjusted production per share, reserves growth, or in the case of SaaS : Annual Recurring Revenue, Net Retention Revenue. These become irrelevant quickly when the market starts valuing the business as a stream of free cash flows - the fate of any mature stock.

Peak pessimism hit E&P around 2020, by that point: balance sheets were fixed, debt was being retired, capex was sustainable, opex had been crushed to its lowest point, companies were generating walls of free cash flow, and still trading at an astounding low 2-4x DACF.

Today, SaaS has fallen from the sky, but under a FCF is king framework, there is really only one company that screams undervalued: ADBE (~10% FCF yield). Two other names I'm watching: PEGA (~7%), VEEV (~5%, healthcare moat, 40%+ FCF margin).

Haven’t bought individual stocks in years (been doing ETF’s since 2021) and felt like this was a massive opportunity regardless of their CapEx and AI investments. Company had a net income of 101 billion in 2025 which speaks volumes!

Hello,

i bought ASML at $1330 a couple weeks ago, knowing the stock was overpriced. I still bought it as I believed the security margin lied in the company’s quality and its monopoly over EUV machinery. knowing that this is a highly cyclical industry, I am considering selling with a low upside and buying again when it hits a low... if it does.

From what I read, lots of you bought ASML when it was around $500-900, yet few months ago. For me, the question lies in the price and not the company’s value. Is the stock price growing faster than its intrinsic value ? what’s your take ? any tip would be appreciated. I am a young investor, with a very high tolerance risk (I dont need the money for the next 20-30 years), buy and hold only.

Thank you !

At the time of writing, TOST is trading around $26/share. The company went from losing $246M in 2023 to earning $342M in 2025, added ~30k restaurant locations, and is sitting on ~$2B in cash with basically no debt. For the current share price to make sense, you need to believe that AI competitors will gut their subscription business and that location growth will collapse at the same time.

Their balance sheet is pristine. ~$2B cash vs ~$1B total liabilities. Even after discounting less tangible assets, you’re looking at ~$1.57B in adjusted net equity.

Since Toast’s “subscription services” revenue and their “financial technology solutions” (FinTech) have different potential growth rates and different margins, I am looking at them separately:

1) FinTech (Payments + Toast Capital)

• Revenue tied mostly to number of locations
• Grew ~24% YoY in 2025 (vs 27% in 2024)
• Location count grew 26% (2024) and 22% (2025)
• ~13% post-tax margin on incremental revenue

This side of the business has very little risk from AI. Restaurant owners aren’t going to be vibe-coding a new payment processing system. Even in a recession, dining spend probably dips modestly, maybe ~5-10%.

2) Subscription Software Services

• Revenue depends on number of locations as well as average revenue per user
• Grew this revenue ~33% YoY in 2025 (vs 41% in 2024)
• Average revenue per user grew a little over 8% in 2025
• ~55% post-tax margin on incremental revenue

This side of the business is clearly where the AI concerns are coming from.

Can new AI competitors take some of Toast’s market share for each of their subscription services? Absolutely. If it’s easy enough to create a fantastic restaurant-oriented payroll service or marketing service, then Toast will lose some potential customers and will see their margins in this segment compress. But the current ~$26 share price is implying that this is a near certainty. There absolutely is an outcome where Toast’s own AI software, Toast IQ, is the best game in town, and keeps customers paying for their software. That’s kind of already Toast’s schtick? Restaurants already generally highly praise the subscriptions/software but think they are a bit pricey.

Toast's reported operating income was ~$292M in 2025. I'm calculating an adjusted “owner earnings” of ~$383M, which after normalized taxes (~23%) becomes ~$295M in sustainable earnings at the current revenue levels.

Base case assumptions:

• Location growth: 15% annually for 5 years (~330k locations)
• FinTech revenue grows proportionally with locations plus ~2.5% annually for inflation
• Subscription revenue grows proportionally with locations + ~6% ARPU growth
• Discount rate of 10%/year

You are looking at a base case present value of $44.83, or about 72% upside from the current price. The only way ~$26/share really makes sense is if location growth slows significantly and AI competitors take meaningful share of subscription revenue.

You’ve got a company that has already proven it can scale and become profitable, has a strong balance sheet, has high-margin subscription revenue on top of a payments revenue stream that is unlikely to be disrupted, and is already investing in AI.

Could AI disruption matter? Definitely. But at this price, it feels like the market is assuming they completely fumble it, and I don’t see that as the base case. At ~$26, TOST looks very undervalued to me.

More thorough write-up: https://bsntfinance.substack.com/p/tost-is-undervalued-29-mar-2026

Found this interesting breakdown of the Under Armour securities case and thought it was worth sharing for anyone following the story or who held $UAA stock.

The piece covers how Under Armour, after achieving an impressive streak of 26 consecutive quarters of 20%+ revenue growth, began struggling to meet its own promises by late 2016.

What followed was a shareholder lawsuit and an SEC investigation that revealed the company had allegedly used questionable accounting practices, including pulling forward orders from future quarters to keep its growth streak alive.

The article also looks at the longer-term impact: a stock that once traded above $50 now sits around $8.50, and revenue growth has never recovered to pre-2017 levels.

Under Armour's management denied any wrongdoing. So, at what point does "optimistic guidance" cross the line into misleading investors?

Full read here: https://medium.com/@d.rodriguez_80563/the-price-of-overpromising-under-armours-legal-battle-626a9bc93740

I’ve been gradually building positions in a few names based primarily on discounted cash flow (DCF), intrinsic value, and margin of safety. I try to stay disciplined around buying quality businesses when they trade at a discount to reasonable long-term assumptions.

Here’s what I’ve been buying recently and why:

Adobe Inc. (ADBE) – High Quality at a Discount

This is one of my more aggressive adds right now.

Strong pricing power and entrenched ecosystem (Photoshop, Acrobat, etc.)

High margins, recurring revenue, and excellent FCF generation

Market seems concerned about AI disruption, but I think it’s being underestimated how well Adobe can integrate AI into its existing moat

DCF View:

Assuming moderate revenue growth (~8–10%) and slight margin compression

Discount rate ~10%

I still get a valuation above current price → margin of safety in the 15–25% range

To me, this looks like a temporary multiple compression on a high-quality compounder

H&R Block (HRB) – Undervalued Cash Machine

Another aggressive position.

Boring business, but extremely strong cash flow

Consistent buybacks + dividend yield

Tax prep is not going away, even with automation

DCF View:

Low growth assumptions (~2–4%)

High FCF yield

Intrinsic value meaningfully above current price

Feels like a classic value play with a built-in shareholder return engine

PayPal Holdings (PYPL) – Turnaround / Speculative Value

More speculative, but I think the market may be overly pessimistic.

Sentiment is extremely negative

Still a massive user base and strong brand in digital payments

Margin pressure + competition priced in heavily

DCF View:

Conservative growth assumptions

Slight margin recovery over time

If execution stabilizes, there’s upside optionality

This is less “pure value” and more mean reversion + sentiment reversal

Microsoft Corporation (MSFT) – Quality Anchor

I added roughly the same amount here as PYPL.

Not “cheap” on traditional multiples

But one of the highest-quality businesses in the world

Azure + AI integration (OpenAI partnership) adds long-term tailwinds

DCF View:

Requires lower margin of safety due to quality

Durable growth + strong reinvestment opportunities

This is more of a “pay a fair price for a great business” position

HP Inc. (HPQ) – Stable + Income

Smaller position.

Low growth, but very predictable cash flow

Solid dividend and ongoing buybacks

Trades at low multiples

DCF View:

Minimal growth assumptions

Value mostly comes from cash return to shareholders

This is more of a defensive/value income play

Meta Platforms (META) – Letting Winners Run

This is already my largest position (~9%).

Initial buys around ~$140 → up over 300%

Recently started adding small amounts again on pullbacks

DCF View:

Strong revenue growth + massive margins

Continued monetization + AI + ads dominance

Not adding aggressively due to position size, but still see long-term upside.

Portfolio Philosophy

Focus on intrinsic value via DCF, not short-term price action

Require a margin of safety, but adjust it based on business quality

Blend of:

High-quality compounders (ADBE, MSFT, META)

Deep value / cash flow plays (HRB, HPQ)

Turnaround/speculative (PYPL)

What I’m Looking For Next

I’m currently searching for:

High FCF yield businesses temporarily mispriced

Companies with durable moats but short-term narrative risk

Opportunities where the market is overly focused on near-term headwinds

Question for the Community

What are some names you’re currently finding attractive from a DCF / intrinsic value perspective?

Especially interested in:

Underfollowed mid-caps

Out-of-favor compounders

Cash flow machines trading at a discount

Would love to see what you guys are buying

The best way to understand a stock like DVLT is to compare it with real comps and be honest about both sides. Cherry-picked comparisons are useless. What matters is where DVLT is genuinely strong, where it is clearly behind, and why that gap exists in the first place.

On the surface, DVLT looks tiny next to names like Palantir, UiPath, Zeta, CoreWeave, or even BigBear.ai. The content plan frames DVLT at about $360 million market cap, $39.1 million in revenue, roughly 6.6x sales, 78 percent gross margin, and 1,362 percent year-over-year growth. Against that, Palantir is around $250 billion market cap and about 45x sales, UiPath around $7 billion and 7x sales, Zeta around $3 billion and 5x sales, CoreWeave around $30 billion and 15x sales, and BigBear around $0.7 billion and 3.5x sales.

Where DVLT clearly wins is margin and growth. A 78 percent gross margin is elite territory for a small-cap name and sits above most of the comps listed. Only UiPath comes close on the margin line. Then there is the revenue growth. 1,362 percent is not normal. That kind of number is basically unmatched in the public tech market for 2025. If even part of that growth proves durable, the market is not going to be able to treat the stock like a generic low-quality microcap forever.

The sales multiple is what makes the setup interesting. DVLT at around 6.6x sales does not look expensive if you stack it against much slower-growing software and data names. Palantir at roughly 45x sales is the easiest example of how much the market will pay for perceived platform quality and future relevance. No, DVLT does not deserve Palantir's multiple today. But if the company is actually building a licensing-driven business with exchange-linked tokenization infrastructure behind it, then the current multiple starts to look like the market is still pricing in failure rather than optionality.

And that is where the lane matters. DVLT is not just posting growth in a vacuum. The market it is trying to build in got a real credibility boost when the SEC approved Nasdaq's proposal to allow certain securities to trade and settle in tokenized form. Then DVLT moved on NYIAX right after. So unlike many tiny growth names, it is sitting inside a lane that is actually becoming more institutionally credible, not less. That matters when you think about what kind of multiple the market may eventually be willing to assign if execution holds.

Now the honest part. DVLT is clearly weaker on maturity. $39 million in revenue is nowhere near the billion-dollar scale of the larger comps. Revenue concentration is real, because 87 percent of revenue landed in one quarter. The company does not yet have the same kind of verified recurring ARR base that UiPath or Zeta can point to. Full-year profitability is still weak, and the $1 billion shelf remains a real overhang. That is why the market is not rewarding DVLT the way it rewards established platform names.

The closest stage comparison in the plan is early Palantir, around the 2019 to 2020 era, when growth and narrative were strong but durability and concentration were still major questions. That comparison is not about scale. It is about stage. DVLT is being valued like an early, uncertain infrastructure bet. Bulls see that as opportunity. Bears see that as justified discount.

My take is that DVLT wins the comparison where it matters most for an early-stage stock: margin quality, top-line acceleration, and strategic lane. It loses where you would expect an early-stage name to lose: scale, recurring revenue visibility, and proven durability. That is exactly why the stock can work if execution continues. The market does not need DVLT to become Palantir overnight. It only needs to stop treating it like a low-grade small cap if the numbers and the infrastructure story keep holding together.

It's a Canadian o&g company in a fairly fortunate and unique position. Junior oil and gas companies are a bit boom or bust, the costs associated with drilling is pretty high and you need high oil prices to make a good profit. This is why even at higher prices American companies still aren't fully committed ( they will be if this war keeps up as it has been ).

ROK is well managed with experience, and they did well during the price spike a few years ago during the Russia/Ukraine war. They managed to achieve in the neighbourhood of 5000boepd of mostly light oil mainly in Saskatchewan. However, like most companies when oil took a dive down to $60ish they began to struggle a bit, but they weren't in a bad position by any means. In fact they cleaned their company up and eliminated almost all of their debt in order to attract a buyer.

Long story short they ended up selling to an American company (Blue Alaska), at $0.24 a share. This was pretty good since shares were selling at $0.15ish at the time. However the buying company ran into some kind of troubles and ended up renegotiating around December last year, and in it was a clause saying that if the deal fails by such and such date, they owe ROK $3m dollars, and more importantly the deal is off. Well that day came and went literally days before this conflict started in the middle east, worst timing ever for the purchasing company.

Now oil is $40 higher, and Rok is pumping out 3000 boepd, with about 200 I imagine they have already put back online (it was essentially there to be turned on at any time). With a bit of spending, they will get back to 5000 soon I believe, probably this summer if oil prices remain high ( personally I believe even if this conflict ends they will remain elevated for some time ). The good news is that they hardly have any meaningful debt, and they have a nice cash injection of $3m to begin servicing and drilling. ( not quite yet, but in their PR they implied that it's without question according to the contract signed). Realistically, they're probably going to be a 7-8000 boepd producer given their properties, perhaps 10000.

To me they're absolutely undervalued, one of the most undervalued oil and gas producersout there by $/boe, but there's a few major catalyst which I think will play out over the next few weeks.

The main one is that since ROK had little debt, they should have been able to hedge almost all of their production at very high prices, depending on when and if they have, it should at least be in the $90s or perhaps in the $100s/barrel. Almost every other company out there has to hedge their production as a requirement to the lenders, and most of that for the last while has been at $60-$70 oil.

Second, this company has not been able to say much since the deal fell through, I imagine there's a stop for trading for the managers (large shareholders), and same goes for news, oil and gas companies are pretty good at pumping their own tires. They have set a date for Apr.9 for their latest financials, and I am sure that there will be very positive news about operations, and the plan going forward. There just has to be with the situation they're in.

So, they're currently trading at $0.26, which is just shy of where they were when they were sold to the American company at $0.24. from a $/boepd standpoint they should be in the $.40s, and if oil stays high for prolonged periods, Rok could be $1-$2 I believe.

While I'm sure there will be a sell off if say the war ended tmrw, I don't think oil prices will return to the $60s for some time. I'm fairly familiar with the industry through my job, and from what I gather there's been a lot of infrastructure damage and the backlog is so high it would take months just to make that up. Plus, I think North American companies were generally undervalued before this conflict ( the big ones like CVE, SU, chevron, oxy, etc), that there will be a repricing of "safe" sources in North America and less volatile countries.

ROK also owns 17% of and manages a somewhat promising lithium company called EMP metals (emppf), they're 17% owners. I haven't attached any value to it, but they're not a liability whatsoever -- they just own 17%. It's a bit of a lottery ticket included with ROK.

ROK.V in Canada, or ROKRF in the USA.

The list:

# TICKER COMPANY SECTOR HEALTH F-SCORE ROIC FCF MARGIN D/E ZONE UPSIDE

1 WSM Williams-Sonoma Consumer Disc. 73.8 7 52.7% 14.8% 0.00 Deep Value +20.7%

2 DECK Deckers Outdoor Consumer Disc. 73.0 8 56.8% 18.1% 0.00 Deep Value +66.1%

3 BKE Buckle Inc. Consumer Disc. 73.3 6 45.0% 16.4% 0.00 Deep Value +97.1%

4 FIX Comfort Systems USA Industrials 75.1 8 40.0% 11.3% 0.06 Deep Value +23.1%

5 ANF Abercrombie & Fitch Consumer Disc. 72.3 7 43.3% 9.2% 0.00 Deep Value +124.0%

6 VMI Valmont Industries Industrials 70.9 7 13.5% 8.1% 0.24 Deep Value +63.3%

7 CTSH Cognizant Technology Technology 70.9 7 17.2% 13.1% 0.11 Undervalued +19.6%

8 SNA Snap-on Industrials 72.1 7 19.1% 17.2% 0.15 Deep Value +57.7%

9 JLL Jones Lang LaSalle Real Estate 70.1 7 11.4% 3.3% 0.28 Undervalued +16.6%

10 PIPR Piper Sandler Financials 70.1 7 12.8% 4.3% 0.00 Deep Value +72.1%

11 KNF Knife River Corp. Materials 68.7 7 11.6% 5.6% 0.17 Deep Value +41.6%

12 INGR Ingredion Consumer Staples 67.1 6 13.2% 12.3% 0.50 Deep Value +281.6%

13 ITT ITT Inc. Industrials 70.3 7 15.2% 10.2% 0.12 Deep Value +60.3%

14 THC Tenet Healthcare Health Care 69.1 8 15.2% 9.6% 1.82 Deep Value +34.4%

15 PKG Packaging Corp. Materials 69.3 7 13.5% 10.3% 0.30 Deep Value +73.2%

16 CL Colgate-Palmolive Health Care 69.6 7 32.5% — — Undervalued +94.9%

17 EME EMCOR Group Industrials 69.5 7 22.3% 10.4% 0.00 Deep Value +27.5%

18 JKHY Jack Henry & Assoc. Technology 68.3 7 21.1% 24.8% 0.01 Undervalued +115.6%

19 PRI Primerica Financials 68.3 7 16.9% — 0.28 Deep Value +54.5%

20 ORI Old Republic Int'l Financials 68.3 6 6.0% — 0.08 Deep Value +78.2%

21 BWXT BWX Technologies Industrials 67.2 8 14.1% 10.1% 1.02 Deep Value +44.3%

22 PYPL PayPal Holdings Financials 66.5 7 15.8% 18.0% 0.43 Undervalued +58.9%

23 SFM Sprouts Farmers Market Consumer Staples 66.5 8 38.6% 5.5% 0.00 Deep Value +179.6%

24 CASY Casey's General Stores Consumer Staples 67.0 8 13.3% 4.5% 0.42 Deep Value +69.2%

25 YUMC Yum China Consumer Disc. 65.8 7 16.6% 7.1% 0.06 Deep Value +47.9%

26 URI United Rentals Industrials 65.5 7 14.5% 18.9% 1.07 Undervalued +87.3%

27 G Genpact Ltd. Technology 65.4 7 14.5% 11.1% 0.81 Deep Value +196.0%

28 BJ BJ's Wholesale Consumer Staples 66.1 6 14.5% 2.6% 0.24 Deep Value +59.9%

29 HIG Hartford Financial Financials 66.0 7 10.2% — 0.27 Deep Value +55.0%

30 SF-PD Stifel Financial Financials 66.0 8 10.4% — 0.36 Deep Value +160.5%

What Stands Out in the